Anti-corruption Coordinative Mechanism between the ICSID and Domestic Enforcement Authorities: A China’s Perspective
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서지정보
ㆍ발행기관 : 이준국제법연구원
ㆍ수록지정보 : China and WTO Review / 7권 / 1호
ㆍ저자명 : Hongwu Yin
ㆍ저자명 : Hongwu Yin
목차
I. IntroductionII. Realistic Difficulties in the ICS IDAnti-corruption Arbitrations
A. Nature of International Investment Corrupt Activities
B. Arbitral Tribunals’ Declination of Jurisdiction over Investment Disputes
C. Uniform Evidentiary Standard and the ICSID Tribunals
D. Loss of Interest Balance between Disputing Parties
E. Tribunal’s Congenital Inadequate Power in Corruption Investigations
III. Legal Basis for Constructing anAnti-corruption Coordinative Mechanism
A. Treaties on Combating Corruption in International Business Transactions
B. Domestic Legislation for Combating Corruptionin International Economic Activities.
IV. Anti-corruption Coordinative Strategiesof the ICS ID Tribunals
A. ICSID Arbitration Proceedings Anterior to Domestic Anti-corruptionEnforcement Procedures
B. Simultaneous Proceedings between the ICSID Arbitration andDomestic Anti-corruption Enforcement
C. Domestic Anti-corruption Enforcement Procedures Anteriorto ICSID Arbitration Proceedings
V. Conclusion
References
영어 초록
When confronted with the host states’ increasing enthusiasm of invoking the corruption defense as an arbitral strategy to frustrate foreign investors’ claims, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) tribunals encounter realistic difficulties in arbitration. The inherent insufficiency of anti-corruption investigative powers bestowed to ICSID tribunals highlights the importance of constructing a coordinative mechanism between the ICSID and any domestic enforcement authorities enlisted to repudiate corruption. The enacted International Criminal Judicial Assistance Law of the People’s Republic of China provides the domestic legal basis for establishing a coordinative international criminal judicial assistance mechanism between such international organizations as ICSID and China’s domestic anti-corruption enforcement authorities. Eventually, the proposed ICSID-China’s anti-corruption mechanism will help the global community fight against international investment corruption in a coordinated way, substantially enhancing any host state’s ability to confront the on-going difficulties also experienced by investment arbitral tribunals.참고 자료
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