MS 워드 
소개글
입찰담합을 막기 위한 leniency program 의 개선을 위한 방법론을 서술한 영문판 페이퍼입니다. 미국 유학 당시에 작성했으며 수업에서 상위권을 차지했을 정도로 질이 좋습니다. 글쓰기 센터에서 첨삭까지 받아서 문법, 단어 오류도 거의 없다고 자신합니다.목차
I. IntroductionII. Actual Policy Reformation
III. Possible Changes
IV. Conclusion
V. References
본문내용
III. Possible ChangesSo far, I explained the reformations that were actually adopted. From now on, things that also can decrease the possibility of bid rigging will be discussed. The first solution is to lower profits from collusions. Lower profits could be due to severe punishment, economical recession, or high discount rates. These three factors will discourage firms from colluding, since the expected cost will be higher than before. When firms decide on doing something, the decision is usually based on a cost-benefit analysis. In other words, they choose where (Benefit-Cost) is maximized.
If the punishment becomes stronger, due to the increased penalty or suspension being imposed, then the costs of collusion will also increase. Or if there is an economical recession going on or discount rates are high, then the firms care more about the present than the future. Firms try to seize cash flow right then, because it is the main factor that determines the firm’s survival. It means that the firms will break the collusion in an effort to dry up the competitors’ resources. Since it is impossible to promote economical recession or high discount rates, which would just happen in a market situation naturally, the government should focus on increasing the punishment levels, which can lead to lowering the possibility of bid rigging. One of the attempts is to deprive the qualification of the firms that participated in the collusion, for two years. This is clearly stated in Korean law (Law about the Contracts in which the Government is Directly Involved).
참고 자료
Brisset, K., and L. Thomas. (2004). Leniency program: A new tool in competition policy to deter cartel activity in procurement auctions. European Journal of Law and Economics, 17.Kim, K. (2004). How to make government procurements more competitive.
Kim, N., & Kim. Y. (2010). Effect of the leniency program and the factors that affect it. Industrial Organization Research, 18(4).
Park, S. (2005). Government procurement and collusion: About the leniency program. Finance Forum, 112.
Young, S. (2006, Nov). Restrictions on bid rigging in government procurements. Competitive Law Research, 14.
