영국회사법상 이사의 수임자의무 (Fiduciary Duty of Director in UK)

서지정보

· 발행기관 : 한국법정책학회
· 수록지 정보 : 법과정책연구 / 11권 / 1호 / 167 ~ 191페이지
· 저자명 : 이기욱

초록

영국의 회사제정법은 역사적으로 오랫동안 이사의 일반적 의무, 즉 우리법상 이사의 선관주의의무나 충실의무에 상당하는 일반적 의무는 규정하고 있지 않았고, 이사의 이익충돌거래나 경업에 관련한 의무에 대한 규정도 법문상으로 마련하고 있지 않았다. 이들에 관해서는 오랫동안 판례법이 그 문제 해결을 맡아 왔던 것인데, 2006년 회사법이 이들을 성문화 하였다. 한편, 영국에서 이사가 부담하는 의무는 보통 이면적으로 논의되고 있다. 하나는 회사에 대한 신임관계에 근거한 수임자의무이고, 또 하나는 회사의 업무집행에 관련한 보통법상의 주의의무이다. 이 글에서는 이러한 이사의 의무 가운데 수임자의무의 개념을 개괄하고, 이것이 전통적으로 ‘금지적 명제’로서 표현되어 온 점을 고찰하였다. 그리고 이를 바탕으로 수임자의무의 근저에 존재하는 ‘no conflict rule’과 ‘no profit rule’을 2006년법상 이사의 일반적 의무 규정과 관련하여 검토하기로 한다. 그리고 영국회사법상 수임자의무가 불충성을 금지하는 자기이익부인의 ‘금지적 의무(proscriptive duty)’ 접근방식과 널리 이사에게 어떠한 행동을 요구하는 ‘지시적 의무(prescriptive duty)’ 접근방식 사이에서 논란의 대상이 되고 있는 상황을 검토한 바, 수임자규제의 법리가 널리 사법체계 전체에 미치고 있다고 생각되는 입장에서라면 많은 수임자 유형에 적용 가능한 ‘금지적 의무’ 접근방식이 ‘지시적 의무’ 접근방식보다 논리적으로 유효하다고 생각된다.

영어초록

The law relating to the fiduciary duties owed by directors and employees to companies is complex and involves several overlapping areas of law. It is, however, a relatively commonplace cause of action; individuals in positions of trust within a company are often tempted to abuse their position in order to steal company secrets, set up in competition, and poach staff and customers.
Fiduciary duties have historically defied easy characterisation. This area of law as it relates to directors and employees is developing and complex. Directors and employees of companies acting out of self-interest have generated an increasing number of claims alleging breach of fiduciary duty.
The issue in this area which has long been debated is that of the appropriate standard of care to be required of directors. Historically, the common law was based upon a very low standard of care, because it was subjectively formulated.
The contents of this paper can be summarized as follows.
The concept of fiduciary duty varies with the way of grasping the concept of duty of loyalty. The approach of proscriptive duty which is based on 'no conflict rule' and 'no profit rule' regards fiduciary duty as clearly limited sense, inadequate availability to ban the concept of self-interest, looking 'prescriptive duty' approach to the Board concerning a wide range of actions it needs to look into the concept.
Specifically set forth Companies Act 2006 general obligation of the directors of these seven kinds of discourse perspective, the 'prescriptive duty' to see that approach is taken, as, according to § 178(2), only § 174 which is so-called duty of care to be non fiduciary duty, including § 172 those outside the fiduciary duty is to become. On the other hand, according to the authors opinion who's position of proscriptive duty approach, § 175 - § 177 are to be fiduciary duty, and § 171 - § 174 are to be non fiduciary duty.
However, there is a difficulty underlying § 170(3) and (4), arising from the fact that, as we shall see, the statutory statement is more than simply a restatement of the commom law. In some cases it clarifies areas of uncertainty in the commom law, for example, in relation to the standard of care expected of directors, whilst in other cases it adopts a different approach from that of the common law, for example, in relarion to the authorisation by independent directors of conflicts of duty. Where there is a departure in the statutory statement from the previous common law, it will obviously be inappropriate for the courts to refer to that common law in the interpretation of the statutory duties.
I think that the concrete verification is required to the reasoning and effectiveness of proscriptive duty approach, regarding the remedy for the breach of fiduciary duty in company law or the application of fiduciary duty on employment like as in adjoining company law.

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