This study re-evaluates arguments that relate states‘ power to the likelihood of interstate conflict by examining this relationship under different international system structure. Dyadic power distributions are assumed to be associated with the probability of an expected outcome in conflict. However, the structure of the international system affects states‘ opportunity and resolves to fight, thereby changing the role of dyadic power distributions in the decision making process of conflict. By exploring the impact of system structure on uncertainty about a likely outcome of interstate conflict, this paper provides a comprehensive explanation for the relationship between power and conflict. To perform multilevel analysis of power, system structure, and conflict, this study employs a multilevel model as an empirical strategy. The test results show that the impact of dyadic power distributions on the probability of conflict varies conditional on polarity in the international system. Specifically, although power disparity reduces the chances of MID onsets in bipolar systems, this negative impact disappears in multipolar systems. This study contributes to the literature of power and conflict theoretically and empirically, in potential, subsuming both the balance of power and power preponderance theories.